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In a context of product innovation, we study two-part tariﬀ licensing between a
patentee and a potential rival which compete in a diﬀerentiated product market
characterized by network externalities. The latter are shown to crucially aﬀect
the relative proﬁtability of Cournot vs. Bertrand when a per unit royalty is
applied. By contrast, we ﬁnd that Cournot yields higher proﬁts than Bertrand
under ad valorem royalties, regardless of the strength of network eﬀects.
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1

Introduction

Empirical evidence suggests that ﬁrms often license to direct competitors their
patented innovation (Jiang and Shi, 2018). Investments in either new technologies or in new product development allow ﬁrms to advance in economic
performance, gaining a competitive advantage via innovation. The literature on
patent licensing considers contracts that assume diﬀerent forms such as either a
ﬁxed-fee or a per-unit/ad valorem royalty, as well as a two-part tariﬀ including
both a ﬁxed fee and a royalty component, generally focusing on the optimality
of a license scheme over the other.1
The present paper investigates, in a framework of product innovation, the
optimal patent licensing by an incumbent when consumers’ preferences exhibit
network eﬀects. Such consumption externalities, which are typical of markets
such as telecommunications, on-line games, digital music/movies, payment systems, software and e-commerce platforms, imply that the value of a good to a
consumer increases as the number of its users grows. Network eﬀects are argued to lie behind the success of the most dynamic and impactful companies in
the world such as Microsoft, PayPal, Facebook, Uber, Twitter and Salesforce.
Most recent Industrial Organization literature points out the key role of network eﬀects in aﬀecting via expectations ﬁrms’ equilibrium network size and
the adoption of innovations, thus achieving a critical mass (David, 1985; Farrell
and Saloner, 1985; Arthur, 1989; Choi, 1994; Economides, 1996a; Cabral et al.,
1999).2 The intensity of network eﬀects has been also shown to impact product
pricing and the strength of ﬁrms’ market power (Cabral, 2011; Katz, Shapiro,
1985 and 1986), the strategic choices of product characteristics (Lambertini and
Orsini, 2001; Baake and Boom, 2001; Gabszewicz and Garcia, 2007) and the
determinants of market structure through ﬁrm entry (Economides, 1996b) and
vertical integration (Dogan, 2009).
Licensing of new products, brands and services has become a crucial revenue
source in network industries. Recent evidence suggests that licensing is a powerful value driver for Nokia, with brand and technology licensing net sales of 1.6
billion Euros in 2017 (Nokia Corporation Financial Report, 2018), and a revenue generator for Microsoft, Ericsson, IBM, Qualcomm and Texas instruments
(Ludlow, 2014). Also, earnings of on-line games’ developers have massively increased over the last years (State of the Developer Nation, 2018). In a lot of
cases licensing occurs between ﬁrms that are direct competitors. See Microsoft
that licensed mobile operating system features to Samsung and HTC (Hoﬀman,
2014) or Apple that obtained from Microsoft an eight-year license for Applesoft
Basic that is a dialect of Microsoft Basic, adapted to the Apple II services of
personal computers. Moreover General Motors (GM) licensed its OnStar ser1 Literature shows that the optimality of licensing schemes depends on whether the patentee
is external to the market (Kamien and Tauman, 1986; Muto, 1993; Erutku, and Richelle, 2007)
or rather is a producer within the market (Wang, 1998), on product diﬀerentiation (Kabiraj
and Lee, 2011; Bagchi and Mukherjee, 2014), on whether ﬁrms compete with respect to
quantities or price (Muto, 1993; Bagchi and Mukherjee, 2014).
2 See Gandal (2008) for empirical studies emphasizing the role of network eﬀects in boosting
ﬁrm success.
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vice, a satellite-based mapping service, to other automobile manufacturers as
Toyota and Honda.
Despite network eﬀects have received wide attention in recent years both in
practice and academic research, the analysis of their eﬀects on licensing behavior
in oligopolistic markets has been limited to very few studies dealing with the
optimality of licensing strategies in a quantity competition framework. Wang
et al. (2012) introduce network externalities in a Cournot model of process
innovation, showing how they may let the patentee exploit the advantages of a
larger market size achieved by favoring the competitor’s production through a
ﬁxed fee, rather than charge a royalty restricting the licensees’ output. The same
mechanism is at work in the product innovation model of Lin and Kulatilaka
(2006) who demonstrate that a pure ﬁxed-fee license dominates a two-part tariﬀ
when the network intensity is high enough. By contrast, Zhao et al (2014)
ﬁnd that ﬁxed-fee licensing never dominates royalty licensing or two-part tariﬀ
licensing when network eﬀects interact with quality diﬀerences in a vertical
product innovation model.
In the present paper we aim at investigating how the presence of network
eﬀects aﬀects the optimal behavior of an incumbent innovator that licenses a
new product technology to a potential market rival through a two-part tariﬀ.3
Market competition can occur under Cournot or under Bertrand, while either a
per-unit and ad valorem royalty is included in the two-part licensing scheme.4
In particular, we focus on how the strength of network externalities aﬀects the
relative proﬁtability of Cournot vs. Bertrand, for each considered contract.
The comparison on proﬁtability between Cournot and Bertrand competition is
an extensively debated issue in oligopoly theory. Following Singh and Vives
(1984), much literature has found a dominance of Cournot over Bertrand with
substitutes (Tanaka, 2001a; Tanaka, 2001b; Tasnádi, 2006, among others). This
result, however, has been reversed in several circumstances: in mixed duopolies
due to the presence of social welfare maximizing ﬁrms (Ghosh and Mitra, 2010;
Matsumura and Ogawa, 2012), in vertically related industries (Correa-López
and Naylor, 2004; Arya et al. 2008; Mukherjee et al., 2012; Alipranti et al.,
2014), under cost and demand asymmetries (Zanchettin, 2006) and substantial
quality diﬀerences (Häckner, 2000). Recently, it has been raised the question of
whether the Singh and Vives (1984)’s result is robust to the presence of network
eﬀects. By dealing with quantity and price competition under network eﬀects
3 Optimal

two-part licensing contracts have been studied, among the others, by Kamien
and Tauman (1984), Erutku and Richelle (2007), Faulí-Oller and Sandonís (2002), Sen and
Tauman (2007), Sen and Stamatopoulos (2009) and Filippini and Vergari (2017).
4 Including a per unit or an ad valorem royalty in a licensing agreement is empirically
observed (Macho-Stadler et al., 1996; Bousquet et al., 1998; Lim and Veugelers, 2003; Trombini
and Comacchio, 2012) and theoretically justiﬁed (San Martín and Saracho, 2010, 2015, 2016;
Heywood et al., 2014; Colombo and Filippini, 2015 and 2016, Fan et al., 2018). Whether a
per-unit or an ad valorem royalty must be included in a licence is found to depend on the
mode of competition (Colombo and Filippini, 2015), on cost convexity (Colombo and Filippini,
2016), on demand or cost uncertainty (Bousquet et al., 1998), on product diﬀerentiation and
the licensee’ development cost for the new product (San Martín and Saracho, 2016), on the
relative eﬃciency of the licensee compared to the licensor (Fan et al., 2018), on asymmetric
information about the value of the patent (Heywood et al., 2014).
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in a symmetric duopoly, Pal (2014) has shown that the the positive eﬀect of
on one ﬁrm’s proﬁts through consumers’ expectations on a larger market size
dominates the negative eﬀect of more aggressive behavior as long as network
eﬀects are suﬃciently intense, which provides the reversal result that Bertrand
proﬁts dominate Cournot proﬁts.5
The debate on Cournot vs. Bertrand proﬁtability has been recently revisited by Chang et al (2017) in a patent licensing game. In this study, a product
innovator charges a ﬁxed fee plus a per unit royalty to a potential rival. They
ﬁnd that the equilibrium royalty rate under Bertrand is always higher than that
under Cournot and causes higher proﬁtability in the former than in the latter,
regardless of the degree of product diﬀerentiation. The optimal royalty rate, indeed, solves in Cournot the licensor’s trade-oﬀ between raising the rival’s cost,
thus gaining from the direct proﬁt channel by expanding her own output, and
reducing the rival’s cost-disadvantage, thus beneﬁting from suﬃciently large licensing revenues. In Bertrand, however, it works as a commitment to let both
ﬁrms set higher market prices, thus beneﬁting from more relaxed market competition. By assuming a per unit royalty, our study extends Chang et al (2017) to
the presence of network externalities, showing that proﬁts may be either greater
or lower under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition, depending on the interplay between the intensity of network eﬀects and the degree
of product substitutability. In particular, increasing network eﬀects, by raising end-users’ utility and shifting market demand through expectations, raise
market proﬁtability on both the direct sales and the licensing channel. This
reduces the equilibrium royalty rate in both Cournot and Bertrand in favor of
a larger ﬁxed fee, which pushes towards higher overall proﬁtability in Cournot
vs. Bertrand as long as product substitutability is low enough. In such circumstances, indeed, the positive eﬀect of expectations on a larger market size on
Cournot proﬁts becomes high relative to that exerted on Bertrand proﬁts, the
latter being more limited due to the greater royalty-induced downward pressure
on the equilibrium prices. Moreover, we show that the type of royalty payment
matters in deﬁning the relative proﬁtability conditions of Bertrand vs. Cournot.
Indeed, the presence of network externalities is shown not to cause any reversal
of market proﬁtability when an ad valorem royalty is included in the two-part
contract, which results in Cournot being more proﬁtable than Bertrand, regardless of the strength of network eﬀects and the degree of product substitutability.
Such a result relies on the fact that, by reducing the equilibrium royalty rate,
network externalities always enhance the Cournot proﬁts to a higher extent than
Bertrand proﬁts. This is due to the positive eﬀect of a lower royalty rate on the
patentee’s output in Cournot, which lets proﬁts increase remarkably through
consumers’ expectations on a larger market size, and to the downward pressure
a lower royalty rate exerts on ﬁrms’ prices in Bertrand, which refrains ﬁrms
from fully exploiting higher consumers’ willingness to pay.6
5 A proﬁt dominance of Bertrand is also found by Pal (2015) in a managerial delegation
context with negative network externalities.
6 As it will be discussed later in the paper, including an ad valorem royalty in the contract
does not aﬀect directly the licensee’s behavior. This leads the patentee to strategically commit
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Our results contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, they
point out the role of network externalities in a licensing framework with price
competition, which has been never investigated in previous literature. Second,
the paper captures the implications of network eﬀects on product innovation
licensing, showing how the result of Chang et al. (2017) that Bertrand is always
more proﬁtable than Cournot under a per unit royalty does not hold under
network eﬀects when product substitutability is suﬃciently low. Third, it shows
that the conclusion achieved by Pal (2014) that the strength of network eﬀects
aﬀects the relative proﬁtability of Bertrand vs. Cournot only applies when a
per unit royalty is included in a two-part licensing contract, while it does not
apply under an ad valorem royalty.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the
model, while Section 3 draws some conclusions.

2

The model

Firm 1 is an incumbent producer facing the following linear demand function:
p1 = a + ny1 − q1
with a > 0, where q1 and p1 denote ﬁrm 1’s output and price, respectively,
and y1 is the consumers’ expectation on ﬁrm 1’s market size. Moreover, n
measures the strength of the network eﬀect. Throughout the paper, we assume
γ
) ∀γ ∈ (0, 1).7 For the sake of simplicity, we
n (γ) ∈ [0, n (γ)) (with n (γ) = 1+γ
assume that both the variable cost and the ﬁxed costs of production are zero.
Firm 1 has to decide on whether to license or not its product innovation to a
potential market rival, namely ﬁrm 2. Technology licensing by ﬁrm 1 allows
ﬁrm 2 to produce a diﬀerentiated network good and to compete against ﬁrm
1 either à la Cournot or à la Bertrand. Following Hoernig (2012), the inverse
demand functions are:8
p1
p2

= a + n (y1 + γy2 ) − q1 − γq2
= a + n (y2 + γy1 ) − q2 − γq1

(1)
(2)

q2 and p2 being respectively ﬁrm 2’s output and price, whereas y2 is consumers’
expectation on ﬁrm 2’s sales. The parameter γ in the range (0, 1) measures
to behave less aggressively following an increase of the royalty rate, thus enhancing its licensing
revenues through a licensee’s output expansion in Cournot and a price increase in Bertrand.
A decrease of the royalty rate caused by increasing network eﬀects, therefore, lets the patentee
expand its output in Cournot and induce a price reduction in Bertrand.
7 Indeed, we assume that the strength of network eﬀects is not to high to avoid that the
extreme case of a negative royalty rate chosen by the patentee to exploit higher proﬁtability
on the rival’s sale channel.
8 As in Chang et al. (2017) and Kitagawa et al., (2014), in our model the licensee is assumed
to produce an additional diﬀerentiated product variety on the ground that the patentee is not
able to produce the same variety prior to licensing because of prohibitive marketing and
development costs.
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the degree of substitutability between the two varieties (γ = 0 implies that
the products are unrelated, whereas γ approaching unity implies almost perfect
product substitutability).
The direct demand functions can be written as:
q1

=

q2

=

a(1 − γ) + ny1 (1 − γ 2 ) − p1 + γp2
(1 − γ 2 )
a(1 − γ) + ny2 (1 − γ 2 ) − p2 + γp1
(1 − γ 2 )

(3)
(4)

The game timing is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm 1 chooses to license
its new product technology or not through the payment of a two-part tariﬀ, i.e.
a lump sum payment plus either a per unit or an ad valorem royalty. In the
second stage, if any, ﬁrm 2 accepts the contract oﬀered by the rival and the
two ﬁrms engage in either Cournot or Bertrand market competition. In Section
2.1 we derive the solution in a scenario with no licensing. The latter is then
compared with the market outcome derived under per unit (ad valorem) royalty
licensing in Section 2.2 (Section 2.3) where we search for the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in both a Cournot and a Bertrand framework.

2.1

The no licensing framework

Firm 1 maximizes with respect to q1 the following proﬁt function:
π1 = (a + ny1 − q1 ) q1
which yields ﬁrm 1’s optimal quantity as a function of consumers’ expectations on the market size y1 :
a + ny1
2
Following Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Hoernig (2012), we apply the fulﬁlled
expectation condition implying that the equilibrium sales equal the expected
market size, i.e., y1 = q1 , thus obtaining the following output:
q1 =

q1NL =
The equilibrium price is:

a
2−n

a
2−n
Therefore, we obtain the following ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts:
pNL
=
1

=
πNL
1

a2
(2 − n)2

(5)

6
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2.2

Two-part tariﬀ licensing with a per unit royalty

We assume that ﬁrm 1 can license its innovation by imposing the payment of a
royalty r ≥ 0 for each unit sold by ﬁrm 2 and a ﬁxed amount F ≥ 0. Therefore,
ﬁrms’ proﬁts are:
= p1 q1 + rq2 + F
= (p2 − r) q2 − F

π1
π2
2.2.1

(6)
(7)

Cournot competition

By using the inverse demand functions (1) and (2) and maximizing proﬁts (9)
and (10) with respect to q1 and q2 , we obtain the following reaction functions:
q1

=

q2

=

a + n(y1 + γy2 ) − γq2
2
a + n(γy1 + y2 ) − γq1 − r
2

Notice that each reaction function shifts outward as consumers’ expectations increase, which denotes that one ﬁrm’s output is positively aﬀected by
expectations on both its own sales and the rival’s sales.
The solution of the system of the reaction functions, under the fulﬁlled expectations’ conditions y1 = q1 and y2 = q2 , gives the optimal quantities:
q1

=

q2

=

a(2 − (n + γ(1 − n))) + rγ(1 − n)
4 − (n(4 − n) + γ 2 (1 − n)2 )
a(2 − (n + γ(1 − n))) − r(2 − n)
4 − (n(4 − n) + γ 2 (1 − n)2 )

∂q2
1
It is immediate to verify that ∂q
∂r > 0 and ∂r < 0, which implies that a
marginal increase of r leads the patentee (licensee) ﬁrm to expand (reduce) its
output.

Given the above quantities, ﬁrm 2’s proﬁts in (7) can be written as follows:
π2 (r, F ) =

(a(2 − (n + γ(1 − n))) − r(2 − n))2
2

(4 − (n(4 − n) + γ 2 (1 − n)2 ))

−F

At the royalty setting stage, maximization of ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts in (6) computed at the optimal quantities leads, under the condition π2 (r, F ) ≥ 0, to the
equilibrium per unit royalty rate:
rC =

a(γ(1 − n) − n)(2 − (γ + n(1 − γ)))2

2 (1 − n) (2 − n)2 − γ 2 (1 − n) (3 − n)
7
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Therefore, the equilibrium ﬁxed fee solving π2 rC , F = 0 is:

F

CU

=

a2 (2 − n)2 − γ (1 − n) (4 − n)

2

2

4 (1 − n) (2 − n) − γ 2 (1 − n) (3 − n)

2

Notice that both rC and F CU are positive in the assumed range of network
eﬀects (i.e., n (γ) ∈ [0, n (γ))).
The ﬁrms’ quantities and prices at the SPNE are:
q1CU

=

q2CU

=

pCU
1

=

pCU
2

=

a((2 − γ)(2 − n) − γ 2 (1 − n))

2((2 − n)2 − γ 2 (3 − n) (1 − n))

a((2 − n)2 − γ (1 − n) (4 − n))

2 (1 − n) (2 − n)2 − γ 2 (1 − n) (3 − n)

a((2 − γ)(2 − n) − γ 2 (1 − n))

2((2 − n)2 − γ 2 (3 − n) (1 − n))

a((2 − n)2 + γ (1 − n) (1 − n) γ 2 − (4 − n) γ + n )
2((2 − n)2 − γ 2 (1 − n) (3 − n))

Then, the equilibrium ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts are as follows
π CU
=
1

a2 n2 + (1 − n) (8 (1 − γ) + γ (2n + γ (1 − n)))
4 (1 − n) (2 − n)2 − γ 2 (1 − n) (3 − n)

(8)

while πCU
= 0. It is worth noting that all market variables increase in n:
2
CU
CU
∂pCU
∂pCU
1
2
1
2
> 0, ∂q∂n
> 0, ∂q∂n
> 0. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the
indeed, ∂n > 0, ∂n
royalty rate decreases in n and the ﬁxed fee increases in n, so that ﬁrm 1 proﬁts’
increase in n.
The following remark states the result obtained by assessing the proﬁtability
of Cournot per-unit-royalty-based licensing vs. no licensing.
Remark 1 In a framework of quantity competition, two-part-tariﬀ licensing
with a per unit royalty is always proﬁtable for the patent holder as compared to
no licensing.
Proof. Appears in the Appendix
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2.2.2

Bertrand competition

By engaging in Bertrand competition, ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 face the direct demand
functions (3) and (4) and maximize proﬁts in (6) and (7) with respect to p1 and
p2 , respectively. We obtain:
p1

=

p2

=

a(1 − γ) + ny1 (1 − γ 2 ) + γ(p2 + r)
2
a(1 − γ) + ny2 (1 − γ 2 ) + γp1 + r
2

By solving the above system of the reaction functions under the fulﬁlled
1 +γp2
2 +γp1
expectations’ conditions y1 = a(1−γ)−p
and y2 = a(1−γ)−p
(1−γ 2 )(1−n)
(1−γ 2 )(1−n) , we get
the following prices:
p1

=

p2

=

a(2 − (n(1 − γ) + γ(1 + γ))) + rγ(3 − 4n + n2 )
4 − (n(4 − n) + γ 2 )
a(2 − (n(1 − γ) + γ(1 + γ))) + r(2 − (n(3 − n) − γ 2 (1 − n)))
4 − (n(4 − n) + γ 2 )

∂p2
1
Observe that ∂p
∂r > 0 and ∂r > 0, which imply that setting a higher r leads
both ﬁrms to charge higher prices.

Firm 2’s proﬁts can be written as follows:
π 2 (r, F ) =

(a(2−(γ(1+γ)+n(1−γ)))−r(2−n)(1−γ 2 ))(a(2+γ−n)−r(2−n)(1+γ))
(1+γ)((4−γ 2 )−n(4−n))2

−F

After computing ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts at the above optimal prices, we maximize
them with respect to r under the condition π2 (r, F ) ≥ 0, getting the optimal
royalty rate:
rB =

a (2 − n + γ)2 (γ − n)

2 (1 − n) (2 − n)2 + γ 2 (5 − 2n)

The equilibrium ﬁxed fee satisﬁes π2 rB , F = 0 and is as follows:
F BU =

a2 ((2−n)(2−n−γ 3 )−γ (2+n2 )(2−γ)+γn(7−4γ))((2−n)(2−n+γ 2 )+γn(3−n))
4(1+γ)((1−n)((2−n)2 +γ 2 (5−2n)))2

Observe that both rB and F BU are positive in the assumed range of network
eﬀects (i.e., n (γ) ∈ [0, n (γ))).
The market variables at the SPNE are:
pBU
1

=

a((2 − n) (2 − γ (1 + n)) + γ 2 (7 − 3n))

pBU
2

=

a((2 − n)2 + γ 2 (6 − γ) − γn (1 + γ))

2( (2 − n)2 + γ 2 (5 − 2n)

2( (2 − n)2 + γ 2 (5 − 2n)
9
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q1BU

=

q2BU

=

a 4 + γ 3 + γ 2 (5 − 3n) + (2 − n) γ − 2n (3 − n)
2

2 (1 − n) (1 + γ) (2 − n) + γ 2 (5 − 2n)
a 4 + γn (3 − n) − n (4 − n) + γ 2 (2 − n)
2

2 (1 − n) (1 + γ) (2 − n) + γ 2 (5 − 2n)

Moreover, ﬁrm 1’s equilibrium proﬁts are:
πBU
=
1

a2 (1 + γ) n2 + 8 + γ 3 + 3 (3 − 2n) γ 2 − 2n (4 − γ)
4 (1 − n) (1 + γ) (4 − (n(4 − n) − γ 2 (5 − 2n)))

= 0. Comparative statics with respect to n reveals that
and π BU
2
∂q1BU
∂n

∂pBU
2
∂n

(9)
∂pBU
1
∂n

>0

∂q2BU
∂n
BU

and
> 0, as far as ﬁrm 1 is concerned, while
< 0 and
> 0 as
respecregards ﬁrm 2. Notice that the variable royalty r and the ﬁxed fee F
tively decreases and increases in n, with network eﬀects positively impacting on
ﬁrm 1 proﬁts.
The comparison between the Bertrand proﬁts under per-unit-royalty-based
licensing and the proﬁts under no licensing allows us to introduce the following
remark.
Remark 2 In a framework of price competition, two-part-tariﬀ licensing with
a per unit royalty is always proﬁtable for the patent holder compared to no licensing.
Proof. Appears in the Appendix

2.2.3

Cournot vs. Bertrand under a per unit royalty

In this section we compare the equilibrium outcomes in Cournot vs. Bertrand,
focusing on the diﬀerence in the per unit royalty rates and the patentee’s proﬁts
under the two competitive regimes.
Lemma 1 The per unit royalty rate under Bertrand is always higher than under
Cournot in the feasible range of γ and n.
Proof. Appears in the Appendix.

A comparison between the proﬁts gained in Cournot and Bertrand yields
the following proposition.

10
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Proposition 1 Suppose that (i) n (γ) ∈ [0, n (γ)), ∀γ ∈ (0, 1), where n (γ) =
γ
1+γ , and (ii) the incumbent ﬁrm licenses its innovation to the entrant by imposing two-part tariﬀ, which involves a ﬁxed fee and a per unit royalty. Then
the following is true.
(a) There exists a critical strength of network externalities n (γ) ∈ [0, n (γ)),
∀γ ∈ (0, 1), such that the equilibrium proﬁt of the incumbent ﬁrm under
Bertrand competition is higher (lower) than that under Cournot competition, if the strength of network externalities is less (greater) than the
critical level n (γ) (see Figure 1).
(b) The higher the degree of product diﬀerentiation, greater is the possibility for
Bertrand proﬁt to be higher than Cournot proﬁt.

Proof. Appears in the Appendix.

Figure 1
An explanation for the result in Proposition 1 is as follows. When n = 0
(Chang et al, 2017), Bertrand competition is more proﬁtable than Cournot due
to the higher royalty rate that is optimally set in Bertrand relative to Cournot
with the aim to soften downstream competition. In Bertrand we observe that
more intense network eﬀects, by enhancing downstream market proﬁtability
through expectations on a larger network size, weaken the patentee’s incentive
to set a relatively high royalty rate, which decreases when n rises. It turns out
that the negative eﬀect of the royalty rate’s reduction on the price set by the
cost-disadvantaged licensee dominates the positive eﬀect through consumers’
expectations, causing p2 to decrease in n. However, due to the cost advantage
of the patentee, the downward pressure exerted by a reduced royalty on its
ﬁnal prices is not enough to overcome the upward pressure due to expectations,
11
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which lets p1 increase in n. While increasing network eﬀects limit Bertrand
market proﬁtability through the negative eﬀect on the the licensee’s price, they
determine an increase of Cournot market proﬁtability by reducing the royalty
rate, then positively impacting on q2 . Such an expansion, however, does not
impede q1 to increase in n, which enhances both ﬁrms’ ability to exploit higher
consumers’ willingness to pay and raises both the licensing revenues and the
patentee’s proﬁts on her direct sales’ channel. It follows that suﬃciently low
product substitutability enhances the negative impact of network eﬀects on the
licensee’s price in Bertrand by reducing the patentee’s incentive to relax market
competition through a high royalty rate. However, it limits the negative impact
of the licensee’s output expansion through network eﬀects on the patentee’s
output in Cournot, thus letting the equilibrium prices increase remarkably. In
such circumstances, we obtain the reversal result that Cournot proﬁts are higher
than Bertrand proﬁts.
Finally, it is worth considering that the proﬁt-dominance of Cournot over
Bertrand becomes more likely, namely occurs in a wider range of values of γ for
any given n, as network externalities get stronger. This positive impact of more
intense network eﬀects on the Cournot higher proﬁtability is in contrast with Pal
(2014) who proves, in a standard duopoly, that higher proﬁtability in Bertrand
than in Cournot occurs under strong enough network eﬀects.9 Conversely, our
model highlights the role of more intense network eﬀects in limiting (enhancing)
the ﬁrms’ ability to exploit higher consumers’ willingness to pay in Bertrand
(Cournot), making the proﬁt-dominance of Cournot over Bertrand more likely.

2.3

Two-part tariﬀ licensing with an ad valorem royalty

In this section we keep the above assumptions on demand and ﬁrms’ costs.
Moreover, we assume that ﬁrm 1 uses a two-part tariﬀ including an ad valorem
royalty d ∈ (0, 1), which is a fraction of rival’s revenues, and a ﬁxed amount
F ≥ 0. We can write ﬁrm 1’s and ﬁrm 2’s proﬁts as follows:
π1
π2
2.3.1

= p1 q1 + dp2 q2 + F
= (1 − d) p2 q2 − F

(10)
(11)

Cournot competition

At the market stage, ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 compete in to quantities facing the
inverse demand function respectively in (1) and in (2). Maximization of ﬁrm
1’s proﬁts in (10) with respect to q1 and maximization of ﬁrm 2’s proﬁts in (11)
9 As already mentioned in the introduction, the result of Pal (2014) derives from the indirect
positive eﬀects of more aggressive conduct on proﬁts via consumers’ expectations dominating
its direct negative eﬀect through lower prices.
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with respect to q2 lead to:
a + n(y1 + γy2 ) − γq2 (1 + d)
2
a + n(γy1 + y2 ) − γq1
q2 =
2
Notice that the optimal licensee’s behavior is not aﬀected by the royalty rate
d. By contrast, a marginal increase of d reduces the optimal patentee’s output
1
(i.e., ∂q
∂d < 0).
q1

=

The above reaction functions yield, under the fulﬁlled expectations’s conditions (y1 = q1 and y2 = q2 ), the optimal quantities:
q1

=

q2

=

a (2 − n(1 − γ) − γ(1 + d))
4 − (γ 2 ((1 − n)2 + d(1 − n)) + n(4 − n))
a(2 − (n + γ(1 − n)))
4 − (γ 2 ((1 − n)2 + d(1 − n)) + n(4 − n))

It can be veriﬁed that, following a marginal increase of d, q1 decreases and
q2 increases, namely an increasing ad valorem royalty included in a two-part
contract induces the patentee to behave less aggressively in order to enhance
her licensing revenues through a more aggressive reaction by the rival ﬁrm.10
After incorporating the above optimal quantities, the licensee’s proﬁts can
be written as follows:
a2 (1 − d) (2 − (n + γ(1 − n)))2

π2 (d, F ) =

−F
(4 − (γ 2 ((1 − n)2 + d(1 − n)) + n(4 − n)))2
At the previous stage, the patentee maximizes her own proﬁt with respect
to the royalty rate d under the condition π2 (d, F ) ≥ 0, thus setting:
dC =

((1 − n) γ − n) (2 − n − (1 − n) γ)2
γ (1 − n) ((2 − γ) (2 − n) − (1 − n) γ 2 )

Then, the equilibrium ﬁxed fee satisﬁes π2 dC , F = 0 and is as follows:
F CV =

a2 ((2−γ)(2−n)−(1−n)γ 2 )(n(2−n)2 +(1−n)(n2 −4n+2)γ 2 −γ(1−n)(2−n)(n(1−γ 2 )+γ 2 ))
2

4γ(1−n)((2−n)2 −(1−n)(3−n)γ 2 )

We ﬁnd that dC and F are positive in the assumed range of network effects (i.e., n (γ) ∈ [0, n (γ))). In this range, moreover, the condition dC ≤ 1 is
veriﬁed.11
10 As

also highlighted by Colombo and Filippini (2015, p. 9), this contrasts with the per
unit royalty case in which an increase of r, by weakening the licensee, leads the patentee’s to
behave more aggressively.
2
2
2
3
11 Indeed, we ﬁnd dC − 1 = − n(n−2) +(1−n)((2+n −4n)γ −(2−n)(1−n)γ +n(n−2)γ ) ≤ 0 for
γ(1−n)((2−γ)(2−n)−(1−n)γ 2 )
n (γ) ∈ [0, n (γ)).
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Firms’ quantities and prices at the SPNE are:
2

q1CV

=

q2CV

=

a (2 − n) − (1 − n) (4 − n) γ
2 (1 − n) (2 − n)2 − (1 − n) (3 − n) γ 2
a (2 − γ) (2 − n) − γ 2 (1 − n)

2 (2 − n)2 − (1 − n) (3 − n) γ 2
2

pCV
1

=

a (2 − n) + γ (1 − n) n − (n − 1) γ 2 + (n − 4) γ

pCV
2

=

a (2 − γ) (2 − n) − γ 2 (1 − n)

2 (2 − n)2 − (3 − n) (1 − n) γ 2
2 (2 − n)2 − 2 (3 − n) (1 − n) γ 2

Finally, ﬁrm 1’s equilibrium proﬁts are:
πCV
=
1

a2 n2 + 8 (1 − n) − γ (1 − n) (8 − 2n − γ (1 − n))
4 (1 − n) (2 − n)2 − γ 2 (1 − n) (3 − n)

(12)

while πCV
= 0.
2
It can be easily checked that dC decreases in n and F CV increases in n. All
market variables are positive in the considered parameters’ region and increase
CV
CV
CV
∂pCV
1
1
2
2
> 0, ∂q∂n
> 0, ∂p∂n
> 0 and ∂q∂n
> 0), as well as ﬁrm 1’s
in n (i.e., ∂n
proﬁts (i.e,

∂πCV
1
∂n

> 0).

Comparing ﬁrm 1’s Cournot proﬁts under ad valorem licensing with ﬁrm 1’s
proﬁts under no licensing, we get the result highlighted in the following remark.
Remark 3 Under quantity competition, two-part tariﬀ licensing with an ad
valorem royalty is always proﬁtable for the patent holder as compared to no
licensing.
Proof. Appears in the Appendix
Moreover, a comparison between the patentees’ Cournot proﬁts under the
two considered licensing schemes, with either a per unit royalty or an ad valorem royalty, yields the equivalence result that is highlighted in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 In a Cournot setting, the patentee is indiﬀerent between licensing
through a per-unit-royalty-based contract and licensing through an ad-valoremroyalty-based contract.
14
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Proof: It directly follows from the identity between (8) and (12).
The equivalence result in Proposition 2 resembles that obtained by Niu
(2013, p. 13) in a context without network eﬀects and can be explained as
follows. Let’s ﬁrst assume that n = 0. Due to strategic substitutability of
quantities, a per unit royalty included in the contract lets the patentee commit
to behave more aggressively by weakening the licensee, which reduces the licensing revenues and positively aﬀects the patentee’s direct channel proﬁts. By
contrast, an ad valorem royalty lets the patentee commit to behave less aggressively due to the positive eﬀect of a higher royalty rate on the licensee’s output.
This raises the licensing revenues, while it reduces the patentee’s proﬁts on the
direct channel. It turns out that, as proﬁt maximization by the patentee under
a two part tariﬀ implies maximization of joint proﬁts, the net eﬀect caused by
a per unit royalty is of the same magnitude but opposite sign of that caused by
an ad valorem royalty, which yields the same equilibrium proﬁts under the two
contract types. Notice that the logic behind the equivalence is the same under
network externalities, the presence of which aﬀects the size but not the sign of
the eﬀects, which compensate each other as in the no-network case.
2.3.2

Bertrand competition

As in Section 2.2.2, in this section we assume that ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 compete
with respect to prices. Moreover, we assume that in this framework the patent
holder charges the licensee with a two part contract which includes an ad valorem
royalty. Maximization of ﬁrm 1’s and ﬁrm 2’s proﬁts in (10) and (11) with
respect to p1 and p2 , respectively, yields the following reaction functions:
p1

=

p2

=

a(1 − γ) + ny1 (1 − γ 2 ) + γp2 (1 + d)
2
a(1 − γ) + ny2 (1 − γ 2 ) + γp1
2

As in the Cournot case, we observe that the optimal licensee’s behavior is
not aﬀected by the royalty rate d, a marginal increase of which raises conversely
1
the optimal patentee’s price (i.e., ∂p
∂d > 0).
We solve the above system under the fulﬁlled expectations’ conditions y1 =
2 +γp1
and y2 = a(1−γ)−p
(1−γ 2 )(1−n) , thus getting the optimal prices:

a(1−γ)−p1 +γp2
(1−γ 2 )(1−n)

p1

=

p2

=

a(2 − γ 2 (1 + d(1 − n)) − n − γ(1 − d(1 − n) − n))
4 − (n(4 − n) + γ 2 (1 + d(1 − n)))
a(2 − γ 2 − γ(1 − n) − n)
4 − (n(4 − n) + γ 2 (1 + d(1 − n)))

It can be veriﬁed that, following a marginal increase of d, both p1 and p2
increase, as in the per unit royalty case.
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At the previous stage, the patentee optimally chooses the two components of
the licensing contract, d and F . The licensee’s proﬁt can be written as follows:
π2 (d, F ) =

a2 (1 − d) (2 − n + γ) 2 − γ 2 − γ(1 − n) − n
2

(4 − (n(4 − n) + γ 2 (1 + d(1 − n)))) (1 + γ)

−F

Subject to π 2 (d, F ) ≥ 0, maximization of the patentee’s proﬁts computed
at the optimal prices yields the equilibrium ad valorem royalty rate:
dB =

γ 2 (4 − 3n + γ) + (2 − n) (−γ (3n − 2) − n (2 − n))
γ (1 − n) ((2 + γ) (2 − n) − γ 2 )

and thus the equilibrium ﬁxed fee satisfying π2 (d, F ) = 0:
F BV =

a2 (1−γ)((2+γ)(2−n)−γ 2 )(n(2−n)2 −γ 2 (2−n2 )+γ(2−n)(n−γ 2 ))
4γ(1−n)(1+γ)((2−n)4 −γ 2 (3−2n)(2(2−n)2 −γ 2 (3−2n)))

Notice that dB ≥ 0 when 0 < n ≤ γ, that is, dB is always positive in the
considered region of the model’s parameters. Moreover, we get:
dB

(2 − n) n (2 − n) + γ n − γ 2 + n2 − 2 γ 2
≥0
γ (1 − n) ((2 + γ) (2 − n) − γ 2 )
n (2 − n) + γ n − γ 2 + n2 − 2 γ 2 ≥ 0

≤

1⇒

⇒

B

The above condition on d is met when n ≥ n (γ), where n (γ) =
∀γ ∈ (0, 1). In the same region we ﬁnd F BV ≥ 0.

√

2+γ−

4(1+γ−γ 3 +2γ 4 +γ 5 )−7γ 2
2(1−γ 2 )

The ﬁrms’ prices and quantities at the SPNE are:
pBV
1

=

a((2 − n)2 + nγ (1 − n) − γ 2 (4 − 3n))

pBV
2

=

a (1 − γ) ((2 + γ) (2 − n) − γ 2 )

q1BV

=

q2BV

=

2 (2 − n)2 − γ 2 (3 − 2n)

2 (2 − n)2 − γ 2 (3 − 2n)

a((2 − n)2 − (4 − 3n) γ 2 + γ n − γ 2 )
2

2 (1 + γ) (1 − n) (2 − n) − γ 2 (3 − 2n)
a((2 + γ) (2 − n) − γ 2 )
2

2 (1 + γ) (2 − n) − γ 2 (3 − 2n)

Moreover, ﬁrm 1’s equilibrium proﬁts are:
=
π BV
1

a2 (8 − γ 3 − γ 2 (7 − 6n) + nγ(2 − n) − n(8 − n))
4 (1 + γ) (1 − n) (2 − n)2 − γ 2 (3 − 2n)

(13)
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while πBV
= 0.
2
As in the previous settings, we ﬁnd that the royalty rate dB and the ﬁxed fee
respectively decreases and increases in n. Likewise, all market variables
F
∂pBV
∂q1BV
∂pBV
1
2
> 0, ∂n
> 0, ∂n
> 0,
and ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts positively depend on n (i.e., ∂n
BV

∂pBV
2
∂n

> 0,

∂πBV
1
∂n

> 0).

Moreover, we compare ﬁrm 1’s Bertrand proﬁts under ad valorem royalty
licensing in (13) with its proﬁts under no licensing in (5), getting the result
included in the following remark.
Remark 4 Under Bertrand competition, two-part tariﬀ licensing with an ad
valorem royalty is always proﬁtable for the patent holder.
Proof: Appears in the Appendix
Finally, we compare ﬁrm 1’s Bertrand proﬁts under ad valorem royalty licensing in (13) with Bertrand proﬁts under per unit royalty licensing in (9), we
obtain the result stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In a Bertrand setting, a per-unit-royalty-based contract yields
higher proﬁts than an ad-valorem-royalty-based contract.
Proof. Appears in the Appendix.
An intuition of the superiority of a per-unit-royalty-based contract over an
ad-valorem-royalty-based contract in Bertrand follows the argument of Colombo
and Filippini (2015, p. 9) who deal with the same comparison under non-drastic
cost reducing innovation and no network eﬀects. Indeed, a marginal increase of
ad valorem royalty induces the patentee to behave less aggressively by setting
a higher price, thus inducing a price increase from the licensee. This positively
aﬀects the patentee’s proﬁts likewise a marginal increase of a per unit royalty
does by imposing a cost on the licensee and softening market competition. It
turns out that, regardless of the extent of network eﬀects, the strategic eﬀect of
a per unit royalty is higher than that induced by an ad valorem royalty, which
causes higher proﬁtability of the former contract than the latter.
2.3.3

Cournot vs. Bertrand under an ad valorem royalty

In this section we compare the equilibrium outcomes under Cournot vs. Bertrand,
focusing on the diﬀerence in the ad valorem royalty rates and the patentee’s differential proﬁts in the two competitive regimes.
Lemma 2 The ad valorem royalty rate under Bertrand is always higher than
under Cournot in the feasible range of γ and n.
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Proof. Appears in the Appendix.
The following proposition states the proﬁt-dominance of Cournot over Bertrand
competition.
Proposition 4 Assume that the incumbent ﬁrm licenses its innovation to the
entrant by imposing two-part tariﬀ, which involves a ﬁxed fee and an ad valorem
royalty. Further consider the parameter space in which the equilibrium ﬁxed fee
is positive and ad valorem royalty rate lies in the interval (0, 1), regardless of
the mode of product market competition — Cournot or Bertrand. Then, the
equilibrium proﬁts of the incumbent ﬁrm under Cournot competition are higher
than that under Bertrand competition.
Proposition 4 proves that, unlike the case of per unit royalty, market profitability is no more aﬀected by product diﬀerentiation and the intensity of network eﬀects. We observe that network eﬀects reduce the optimal royalty rate in
favor of the ﬁxed component of the licensing contract, due to increased market
proﬁtability on both the direct sales channel and the licensee’s channel. The
royalty rate reduction leads to lower licensee’s aggressiveness both in Cournot
and in Bertrand, which positively aﬀects the proﬁts gained by the patentee
through its output expansion in the former and negatively aﬀects those gained
in the latter due to a reduction of both prices. This results in a superiority
of the Cournot proﬁts over the Bertrand proﬁts, regardless the strength of the
network eﬀects and product diﬀerentiation.

3

Concluding remarks

This paper has reconsidered the relative proﬁtability of Cournot vs. Bertrand
competition in a network market in which a patent holder licenses her product
innovation to a potential rival through a two part tariﬀ. We have found that
the interplay between the intensity of network eﬀects and the degree of product
substitutability aﬀects the relative market proﬁtability in Cournot vs. Bertrand
under a per unit royalty. The latter, indeed, has been shown to induce cost
diﬀerences which refrain ﬁrms from fully exploiting a higher consumers’ willingness to pay under network eﬀects in Bertrand, while they still enable ﬁrms
to fully exploit the advantages of a larger market size in Cournot. This can
determine a dominance of the Cournot proﬁts over the Bertrand proﬁts, which
becomes more likely the lower the degree of product substitutability and the
more intense the network eﬀects. In this perspective, our ﬁndings reveal the
role of network eﬀects in causing a reversal result with respect to Chang et al.
(2017) which prove that Bertrand proﬁts are always higher than Cournot profits in a non-network market. Conversely, we demonstrate that the impact of
network externalities on the strategic eﬀect induced by an ad valorem royalty
ensures higher Cournot proﬁts than Bertrand proﬁts, regardless of the strength
of network eﬀects and product substitutability.
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Our ﬁndings can provide insights on proﬁtability conditions in network markets which may give rise to antitrust concern. We leave to future research the
analysis of social desirability of our ﬁndings, as well as their robustness to the
assumption that either the licensee is also an incumbent in the market or the
patentee endogenously chooses her R&D (quality improving) investment level.

Appendix
Proof of Remark 1
Consider the diﬀerence between ﬁrm 1’s Cournot proﬁts of licensing through
a per unit royalty in (8) and the no licensing proﬁts in (5). For all γ ∈ (0, 1)
and n ∈ [0, n̂(γ)), the following holds true:
2

πCU
− πNL
=
1
1

a2 ((2−n)2 −γ(1−n)(4−n))
2

4(1−n)(2−n)

((2−n)

2

−(1−n)(3−n)γ 2 )

> 0.

Proof of Remark 2
Consider the diﬀerence between ﬁrm 1’s Bertrand proﬁts of licensing through
a per unit royalty in (9) and the no licensing proﬁts in (5). For all γ ∈ (0, 1)
and n ∈ [0, n̂(γ)), the following holds true:
− πNL
=
πBU
1
1
a2 ((2−n)2 ((n2 +6n−4)γ+(2−n)2 )+γ 2 (16(1−γ)−6n3 +(25−7γ)n2 −8(4−3γ)n))
4(1−n)(2−n)2 (1+γ)(4−(n(4−n)−γ 2 (5−2n)))

> 0.

Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the diﬀerence between the per unit royalty rates derived in Section
2.2 in the two frameworks of Cournot and Bertrand. For all γ ∈ (0, 1) and
n ∈ [0, n̂(γ)), the following holds true:
rB − r C =
a(γ−n)((2−n)2 −γ 2 (1−n)(3−n))(2−n+γ)2 −a(γ(1−n)−n)(2−(γ+n(1−γ)))2 ((2−n)2 +γ 2 (5−2n))
>
2(1−n)((2−n)2 +γ 2 (5−2n))((2−n)2 −γ 2 (1−n)(3−n))
0.
Proof of Proposition 1
We consider the patentee’s proﬁt diﬀerence between Cournot and Bertrand under per-unit-royalty-based licensing. From (8) and (9) we obtain the following:
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CU
Z = πBU
=
1 −π 1

a2 γ(1−γ)[(2−n)((2−n)(n2 +γ 3 (1−n))−n(2−n(4−n))γ )−n(1−n)(8−3n)γ 2 ]
2(1−n)(1+γ)[4−(n(4−n)−γ 2 (5−2n))][(2−n)2 −γ 2 (1−n)(3−n)]

It is easy to check that
(a) a2 γ (1 − γ) > 0, since a > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1); and
2

(b) 2 (1 − n) (1 + γ) [4−(n(4−n)−γ 2 (5−2n))][(2 − n) −γ 2 (1 − n) (3 − n)] >
0, since n ∈ [0, 1) and γ ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, Sign(Z) = Sign(f(n, γ)), where
f(n, γ) = (2 − n) (2 − n) n2 + γ 3 (1 − n) − n (2 − n (4 − n)) γ −n (1 − n) (8 − 3n) γ 2 .
Now, we have the following.
(i) f(0, γ) = 4γ 3 > 0, ∀γ ∈ (0, 1);
(ii) f(n̂(γ), γ) = −

γ 3 (2−γ 2 )
(γ+1)3

< 0, ∀γ ∈ (0, 1).

< 0, if 0 ≤ n < n0 (γ)
(iii)
= 0, if n = n0 (γ);
> 0, if n0 (γ) < n ≤ n̂(γ)
where n0 (γ) = Root[−4γ −8γ 2 −8γ 3 +(8+20γ +22γ 2 +10γ 3 )#1+(−12−18γ −
9γ 2 − 3γ 3 )#12 + (4 + 4γ)#13 , 1]. It follows that 0 < n0 (γ) < n̂(γ), ∀γ ∈ (0, 1).
∂f (n,γ)
∂n

(iv) f (n0 (γ), γ) < 0, ∀γ ∈ (0, 1).
From (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) it follows that there exists an n(γ) ∈ (0, n0 (γ)) such
that, for all γ ∈ (0, 1),
< 0, if 0 ≤ n < n(γ)
.
f(n, γ) = 0, if n = n(γ)
> 0, if n(γ) < n ≤ n̂(γ)
The expression for n(γ) is given by
n(γ) = Root[4γ 3 + (−4γ − 8γ 2 − 8γ 3 )#1 + (4 + 10γ + 11γ 2 + 5γ 3 )#12 + (−4 −
6γ − 3γ 2 − γ 3 )#13 + (1 + γ)#14 , 1]. Therefore, it follows that
< 0, if 0 ≤ n < n(γ)
CU
, for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
−
π
πBU
=
0, if n = n(γ)
1
1
> 0, if n(γ) < n ≤ n̂(γ)
It can be checked that

∂n(γ)
∂γ

> 0 for all γ ∈ (0, 1).

[QED]
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Proof of Remark 3
Consider the diﬀerence between ﬁrm 1’s Cournot proﬁts of licensing through
an ad valorem royalty in (12) and the no licensing proﬁts in (5). For all γ ∈ (0, 1)
and n ∈ [0, n̂(γ)), the following holds true:
2

− πNL
=
πCV
1
1

a2 ((2−n)2 −γ(1−n)(4−n))

4(1−n)(2−n)2 ((2−n)2 −γ 2 (1−n)(3−n))

> 0.

Proof of Remark 4
Consider the diﬀerence between ﬁrm 1’s Bertrand proﬁts of licensing through
an ad valorem royalty in (13) and the no licensing proﬁts in (5). For all γ ∈ (0, 1)
and n ∈ [0, n̂(γ)), the following holds true:
− πNL
=
πBV
1
1
2
a ((2−n)2 ((2−n)2 +nγ(6−n)−4γ )+7n2 γ 3 −n2 γ 2 (23−6n)−8γ 2 (2−γ)(1−2n))
> 0.
4(1−n)(1+γ)(2−n)2 ((2−n)2 −(3−2n)γ 2 )
Proof of Proposition 3
We consider the diﬀerence between (9) and (13), namely the diﬀerence between the Bertrand patentee’s proﬁts under a per unit royalty and those gained
under an ad valorem royalty. For all γ ∈ (0, 1) and n ∈ [0, n̂(γ)), the following
holds true.
− πBV
=
πBU
1
1

a2 γ(2+γ−n)2 (n−γ)2
2(1−n)(1+γ)(n2 +2γ 2 n−4n−3γ 2 +4)(4−4n+n2 +5γ 2 −2γ 2 n)

> 0.

Proof of Lemma 2
Consider the diﬀerence between the ad valorem royalty rates derived in Section 2.3 in the two frameworks of Cournot and Bertrand. For all γ ∈ (0, 1) and
n ∈ [0, n̂(γ)), the following holds true.
dB −dC =

γ ((2−n)(n(n−1)γ 3 +(2−n)(4−n(2−γ)(2−n)))−γ 2 (12+18n2 −6n3 −24n+n4 ))
(1−n)((2+γ)(2−n)−γ 2 )((2−γ)(2−n)+(n−1)γ 2 )

> 0.

Proof of Proposition 4
First, note that, in the case of two part tariﬀ licensing involving an ad
valorem royalty and a ﬁxed fee, the equilibrium ﬁxed fee is positive and ad
valorem royalty rate lies in the interval (0, 1) irrespective of the mode of product
market competition — Cournot or Bertrand, if the following holds true.
γ
, and (ii) n ≥ n (γ), where
(i) n ∈ [0, n̂(γ) ) ∀ γ ∈ (0, 1), where n̂(γ) = 1+γ
√
2+γ− 4(1+γ−γ 3 +2γ 4 +γ 5 )−7γ 2
∀γ ∈ (0, 1).
n (γ) =
2(1−γ 2 )
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Next, in the case of two part tariﬀ licensing involving an ad valorem royalty
and a ﬁxed fee, the equilibrium proﬁts of the incumbent under Cournot competition and under Bertrand competition are, respectively, given by equations
(12) and (13). From (12) and (13), we get the following:
− π BV
=
G = π CV
1
1

a2 γ 2 [(n2 −3(n−1))γ 3 +(2−n)(2n(1−γ 2 )−(2−n)γ )]
2(1+γ)[(2−n)2 −(3−2n)γ 2 ][(1−n)(3−n)γ 2 −(2−n)2 ]

Now, it is easy to check that:
(a) the denominator of G is negative, for all n ∈ [0, 1) and γ ∈ (0, 1);
(b) the numerator of G is√negative, if and only if 0 < n ≤ n(γ) holds true,

where n(γ) =

4−3γ 3 +4γ(1−γ)− 16(1−2γ 2 )+γ 4 (20−3γ 2 )
2(1−γ 2 )(2+γ)

∈ (0, 1) for all γ ∈ (0, 1).

γ
Moreover, it can be checked that n(γ) > 1+γ
= n̂(γ) ∀γ ∈ (0, 1). Clearly, G > 0
holds true for all γ ∈ (0, 1) and n ∈ [0, n̂(γ)).
γ
, and (ii)
Next, note that both (i) n ∈ [0, n̂(γ) ) ∀ γ ∈ (0, 1), where n̂(γ) = 1+γ
√
2+γ− 4(1+γ−γ 3 +2γ 4 +γ 5 )−7γ 2
∀γ ∈ (0, 1) are satisﬁed,
n ≥ n (γ), where n (γ) =
2(1−γ 2 )
if n < n̂. It follows that n < n̂ ⇔ γ < 0.574743.
[QED]
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